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ABSTRACT
The 2000 amendments to Rule 702 sought to resolve the debate
that had emerged in the courts in the 1990s over the proper meaning
of Daubert by codifying the rigorous and structured approach to
expert admissibility announced in the Daubert trilogy. Fifteen years
later, however, the amendments have only partially accomplished
this objective. Many courts continue to resist the judiciary’s proper
gatekeeping role, either by ignoring Rule 702’s mandate altogether or
by aggressively reinterpreting the Rule’s provisions.
Informed by this additional history of recalcitrance, the time has
come for the Judicial Conference to return to the drafting table and
finish the job it began in 2000. Rule 702 should be amended to secure
the promise of Daubert and effectively protect future litigants and
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juries from the powerful and quite misleading impact of unreliable
expert testimony.
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INTRODUCTION
Until the mid-1980s, American courts, including federal courts,
typically applied a very lenient standard to the admissibility of expert testimony.1 With the exception of the general acceptance test
outlined in Frye v. United States,2 which was applied primarily to a
narrow category of forensic testimony in criminal cases,3 the only
significant limitation unique to expert testimony was that an expert
witness needed to be qualified in his field, with qualifications defined liberally.4
The rise of toxic tort litigation, characterized by cases often based
on scientific premises that were dubious at best, led federal courts
to apply the original Federal Rule of Evidence 702 (Rule 702) in
novel ways to develop more stringent standards for the admissibility
of expert testimony.5 Some courts began to apply the Frye test to
toxic tort controversies.6 Other courts developed a test meant to ensure that expert testimony was “reliable.”7 Still others were content
with the “let-it-all-in” philosophy, though at times with an allowance for excluding expert testimony contradicted by a wealth of
empirical studies.8

1. See DAVID H. KAYE, DAVID E. BERNSTEIN & JENNIFER L. MNOOKIN, THE NEW WIGMORE:
A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE—EXPERT EVIDENCE §§ 2.1.1-2.1.3 (Richard D. Friedman ed., 2d ed.
2010).
2. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
3. Joseph Sanders, Applying Daubert Inconsistently? Proof of Individual Causation in
Toxic Tort and Forensic Cases, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1367, 1380-81 (2010).
4. See KAYE ET AL., supra note 1, §§ 1.2, 2.1.1. Traditionally, many courts also insisted
that expert testimony be “beyond the ken of the jury.” Id. But once the Federal Rules of
Evidence were enacted, that limitation withered in favor of admitting any expert testimony
deemed “helpful” to the jury. See id. § 2.2.2, at 43-45.
5. See David E. Bernstein, The Misbegotten Judicial Resistance to the Daubert Revolution, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 27, 35-40 (2013).
6. Id. at 40.
7. Id. at 39. In 1991, the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules proposed amending Rule 702 to allow only expert testimony that is “reasonably reliable and will
substantially assist the trier of fact.” COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE (1991), reprinted in 137
F.R.D. 53, 156-58 (1991).
8. Bernstein, supra note 5, at 35-38, 40.
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In 1993, in the landmark case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Supreme Court resolved the debate in favor of the
reliability test.9 The Court held that in referencing scientific “knowledge,” Rule 702 established reliability as a prerequisite for the admissibility of expert scientific testimony.10
However, the Court larded Daubert with conflicting rhetoric that
left ambiguous whether the case should be interpreted as establishing a strict or lenient standard of admissibility.11 On the one hand,
the Court noted “the ‘liberal thrust’ of the Federal Rules [of
Evidence] and their ‘general approach of relaxing the traditional
barriers to “opinion” testimony,’ ”12 and emphasized the “flexible”
nature of the inquiry in which trial courts must engage.13 The Court
expressed optimism about the capabilities of the adversarial process
and of the jury, and spoke of “shaky but admissible evidence.”14
On the other hand, the Court insisted that trial court judges
adopt “a gatekeeping role” to “ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”15 The
Court emphasized that Rule 702 “requires a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility.”16
And the Court explained that under the Federal Rules, a trial judge
“exercises more control over experts than over lay witnesses.”17
In two subsequent cases, General Electric Co. v. Joiner18 in 1997
and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael19 in 1999, the Court clarified several post-Daubert disputes that had arisen between courts citing to
these competing Daubert passages. Joiner held that (a) the reliabil9. 509 U.S. 579, 579-80 (1993).
10. Id. at 580.
11. Bernstein, supra note 5, at 41-43.
12. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169
(1988)).
13. Id. at 594.
14. Id. at 596. “The Court’s more forgiving remarks seemed aimed primarily at a mythical
version of Frye, understood as an ‘austere’ rule that made it extremely difficult to present
expert testimony,” which is not, in fact, how Frye had traditionally been applied. Bernstein,
supra note 5, at 43.
15. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 597.
16. Id. at 592.
17. Id. at 595 (quoting Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence Is
Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 632 (1991)).
18. 522 U.S. 136, 136-37 (1997).
19. 526 U.S. 137, 138-39 (1999).
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ity test may be applied to an expert’s reasoning process, not just to
his general methodology, and (b) appellate courts should review all
district court admissibility rulings under Daubert via the abuse-ofdiscretion standard, regardless of whether the lower court excluded
or admitted the testimony at issue.20 Kumho Tire held that the reliability test applies to nonscientific as well as scientific expert
testimony.21 This prevented courts from evading the reliability test
by declaring the testimony at issue to be “non-scientific.”22
By 2000, the Court unambiguously stated that Daubert established “exacting standards of reliability” for the admissibility of
expert testimony.23 Some willful lower court judges, however, had
shown a propensity to ignore the revolutionary implications of the
Daubert trilogy,24 preferring to apply the much more liberal preDaubert standards.25 Given that the original language of Rule 702
was hardly clear,26 and that many courts insisted on relying on that
language plus cherry-picked, permissive-sounding language from
Daubert (without regard for Joiner and Kumho Tire), momentum
built to amend the Federal Rules of Evidence to better reflect and
clarify the rule on expert admissibility.27
In 2000, the Judicial Conference of the United States, with the approval of the Supreme Court and Congress, amended Federal Rule
of Evidence 702 for the express purpose of resolving conflicts in the
courts about the meaning of Daubert.28 Through this amendment,
20. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 143, 146.
21. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 147-49.
22. For an example of a court doing so, see Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d
1433 (11th Cir. 1997), rev’d sub nom. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
23. Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000).
24. See David L. Faigman, The Daubert Revolution and the Birth of Modernity: Managing
Scientific Evidence in the Age of Science, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 893, 895 (2013) (describing the
changes of the Daubert trilogy as “revolutionary”).
25. See Bernstein, supra note 5, at 43-44, 47-48.
26. Original Rule 702 provided: “If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” 5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 702 App.01 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., Matthew Bender
& Co. 2d ed. 2015).
27. See infra notes 51-71 and accompanying text.
28. See MAY 1, 1999 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE RULES TO THE
STANDING COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 5-7, http://www.uscourts.
gov/RulesAndPolicies/rules/reports/EV05-1999.pdf [http://perma.cc/CS23-DNGX] [hereinafter
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the Judicial Conference sought to codify a “more rigorous and
structured approach” to the scrutiny of expert testimony than some
courts were then employing.29 The Judicial Conference rejected the
argument that Daubert scrutiny was directed solely at unfounded
methodologies such as astrology.30 Rather, the Conference clarified,
or so it thought, that trial courts must scrutinize the factual foundation of expert testimony and the reliability not only of the expert’s
methodology but also of the expert’s application of that methodology
to the facts at issue.31
Fifteen years have passed, and it is now apparent that the 2000
amendments to Rule 702 have not succeeded in entrenching these
requirements. Although many courts have faithfully applied amended Rule 702, the same divisions that existed in the courts prior to
2000 continue to exist today—and on the very same issues that the
Judicial Conference sought to resolve.
For example, the Ninth Circuit recently held that a district court
must confine its analysis of expert testimony solely to the reliability
of the expert’s methodology and must leave to the jury the question
of whether the expert applied that methodology in a reliable manner.32 In so holding, the Ninth Circuit not only disregarded the clear
intent of amended Rule 702(d), but also remarkably rejected the
holding of the very same Third Circuit case upon which the Judicial
Conference directly relied in 2000 when it included that provision
in Rule 702.33 As we shall see, this is far from the only circuit court

MAY 1, 1999 REPORT].
29. Id. at 7.
30. Id. at 47.
31. Id. at 5-7; see also FED. R. EVID. 702(b), (d). This Rule, along with other Federal Rules
of Evidence, was restyled in 2011 “to make [it] more easily understood and to make style and
terminology consistent throughout the rules.” FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to
2011 amendment. This “restyling” was not meant to make any substantive changes to the
meaning of the rules. Id.
32. City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 750 F.3d 1036, 1047 (9th Cir. 2014).
33. Compare id. at 1047-48 (rejecting reasoning in In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35
F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994)), with FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000
amendment (citing same reasoning as In re Paoli in explaining that the 2000 amendment
“specifically provides that the trial court must scrutinize not only the principles and methods
used by the expert, but also whether those principles and methods have been properly applied
to the facts of the case”).
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opinion to ignore amended Rule 702 in favor of more lenient
admissibility standards.34
It is not terribly surprising that some judges have continued to
resist the revolutionary change in the way federal courts address
the admissibility of expert testimony. Rule 702, as amended, not
only codifies radical changes in the substantive law of expert testimony,35 but it also places substantial new demands on judges by
requiring them to take a far more managerial role over expert
witnesses.36 Although the language of the 2000 amendments appeared sufficient at the time to rein in recalcitrant judges who had
tried to evade the Daubert trilogy’s exacting admissibility standards, with the benefit of hindsight, it is now clear that the Judicial
Conference failed to account for the tenacity of those who prefer the
pre-Daubert approach to expert testimony.
First, a number of courts have simply ignored the Rule 702
amendment, relying instead on Daubert case law prior to the
amendment or even on case law prior to Daubert itself.37 At least
some of these courts seem to have misread the Advisory Committee’s explanation that Rule 702 was “amended in response to
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and to the many cases
applying Daubert”38 as meaning that the Rule 702 amendments left
all preamendment case law intact.39 In fact, as we shall see, the
amendments were explicitly meant to take sides in disputes that
had arisen in federal precedents after Daubert.40
Relatedly, many courts continue to rely on the Supreme Court’s
analysis of Rule 702 in Daubert, failing to recognize that the wording
34. See infra notes 150-67 and accompanying text.
35. See David E. Bernstein, The Unfinished Daubert Revolution, 10 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 35, 35 (2009) (“[T]he emergence of the Daubert—702 reliability test
for expert testimony is probably the most radical, sudden, and consequential change in the
modern history of the law of evidence.”).
36. See Faigman, supra note 24, at 907 (suggesting that the managerial aspect of Daubert
is perhaps its most radical feature); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Trial Judges—Gatekeepers or
Usurpers? Can the Trial Judge Critically Assess the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Without
Invading the Jury’s Province to Evaluate the Credibility and Weight of the Testimony?, 84
MARQ. L. REV. 1, 5 (2000) (discussing judges’ case management responsibilities under Daubert).
37. See Bernstein, supra note 5, at 51-52.
38. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment (citation omitted).
39. See Bernstein, supra note 5, at 52.
40. See infra notes 143-49 and accompanying text.
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of the Rule at the time of Daubert was significantly different than
the amended Rule as it exists today.41 Finally, as discussed in Part
IV, the partial failure of the 2000 amendments can be attributed to
faulty draftsmanship, because the amendments’ language is insufficiently blunt to restrain judges who are inclined to resist a strong
gatekeeper role.
The continued divisions among the federal courts over the proper
standards for admission of expert testimony have resulted in the
uneven administration of justice in the federal courts. Judicial
protection from unreliable expert testimony has become dependent
upon the happenstance of the jurisdiction in which a case is filed, or
even the particular judge the parties happen to draw. This disarray
not only contradicts the intent of the 2000 amendments to Rule 702;
it also conflicts with Congress’s broader intent that the Federal
Rules of Evidence have uniform application nationwide.42
Most important, the failure of the 2000 amendments has undermined the primary purpose of the Federal Rules, as set forth in Rule
102, “to administer every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable
expense and delay, and promote the development of evidence law,
to the end of ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination.”43 As the Supreme Court cautioned in Daubert: “Expert
evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading because of the
difficulty in evaluating it.”44 The Daubert trilogy, as codified in Rule
702, shifted judicial attention “to the kind of empirically supported,
rationally explained reasoning required in science, [which] has
greatly improved the quality of evidence upon which juries base
their verdicts.”45 The inability of Rule 702, as presently drafted, to
consistently secure this purpose requires that action be taken.

41. Prior to the 2000 amendments, Rule 702 provided only: “If scientific, technical, or
otherwise specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” Act of Jan.
2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1937 (1975) (establishing the Federal Rules of Evidence).
42. Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1497 (3d Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Chase,
340 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing cases that suggest Congress’s intent that the Federal
Rules be applied uniformly nationwide).
43. FED. R. EVID. 102.
44. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993).
45. Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1197 (11th Cir. 2002).
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The need for proper Rule 702 gatekeeping against unreliable
scientific evidence should not be a partisan issue. Some of the
earliest calls for a crackdown on dubious expert testimony in toxic
torts cases came from editorials in liberal-leaning publications, such
as The New England Journal of Medicine and The New York
Times.46 The editors at these publications were especially concerned
about how bogus lawsuits were jeopardizing access to contraception,
in particular after a notorious case in which the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed a $5 million dollar award to a plaintiff who alleged that his
mother’s use of a common spermicide had caused his birth defects.47
The revolution in the rules governing the admissibility of expert
testimony began with a unanimous, bipartisan Supreme Court
opinion in Daubert and continued to draw support from all of the
Justices, save Justice Stevens, in Joiner and Kumho Tire.48 The
Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules that drafted the 2000
amendments to Rule 702 had no discernable agenda beyond improving the quality of expert testimony admitted in American courts.
Moreover, although the debate over admissibility often plays out
in the arena of toxic tort litigation, with corporate defendants challenging the reliability of testing proffered by plaintiffs’ experts, the
Federal Rules also govern criminal proceedings. Many commentators have bemoaned the “lackadaisical” approach that some courts
have taken in screening out unreliable forensic evidence in criminal
prosecutions.49 Public defenders offices have argued that “[m]ore
vigilant ‘gatekeeping’ is especially important in criminal cases,
where innocent defendants can lose their liberty based on faulty
46. See, e.g., James L. Mills & Duane Alexander, Occasional Notes: Teratogens and “Litogens,” 315 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1234, 1234-35 (1986); Opinion, Federal Judges vs. Science, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 27, 1986), http://www.nytimes.com/1986/12/27/opinion/federal-judges-vs-science.
html [http://perma.cc/HZC3-F6TM].
47. Wells v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 788 F.2d 741, 742-43, 747-48 (11th Cir. 1986).
48. See infra note 208 and accompanying text.
49. DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY § 1:30 (2014) (“As a general matter, courts have been, at best, lackadaisical and, at worst, disingenuous, in carrying out their gatekeeping duties toward forensic
science.”); see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED
STATES: A PATH FORWARD 11 (2009) (“[J]udicial dispositions of Daubert-type questions in criminal cases have been criticized by some lawyers and scholars who thought that the Supreme
Court’s decision would be applied more rigorously.... Federal appellate courts have not with
any consistency or clarity imposed standards ensuring the application of scientifically valid
reasoning and reliable methodology in criminal cases involving Daubert questions.”).
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forensic evidence, and adversarial testing is less likely to curb the
impact of ‘bad science.’”50
This Article proposes to remedy the inconsistent enforcement of
expert testimony gatekeeping via a new amendment to Rule 702.
Part I reviews the history of the 2000 amendments, starting with
proposed legislation in Congress in the mid-1990s and running
through the rule-drafting process in the Judicial Conference’s Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules and approval by the Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and the full Judicial
Conference. This review focuses on the Judicial Conference’s attempt to resolve three conflicts that had emerged in the years immediately following Daubert: (1) whether the court must determine
that an expert reliably applied his methodology to the facts of the
case, (2) the proper scrutiny of the factual foundations of an expert’s
testimony, and (3) the degree to which a trial court may defer to an
expert’s unsubstantiated assertions that his testimony is reliable.
Part II describes the resistance in some courts to the language
and intent of Rule 702 as amended in 2000. Rather than faithfully
construing Rule 702 as they would the other federal evidentiary
rules, some federal judges have ignored the Rule altogether, relying
instead on outdated case law that the 2000 amendments specifically
sought to overrule. While these courts occasionally provide lip service to Rule 702, they have been far more lenient about admitting
expert testimony than any reasonable reading of the Rule would
allow.
Part III surveys the case law following the 2000 amendments to
Rule 702 and shows that the three preamendment conflicts over
expert admissibility identified in Part I still exist. Notably, many of
the courts that persist in applying the more lenient admissibility

50. Brief for Public Defender Service as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 16,
Motorola, Inc. v. Murray, No. 14-CV-1350 (D.C. Feb. 10, 2015); see also id. at 1 (“Keeping ‘bad
science’ out of the courtroom is especially important in criminal cases, where juries place tremendous weight on scientific evidence, and unreliable forensic evidence is a leading cause of
wrongful convictions.”). The D.C. Public Defender Service cited specifically to the findings of
the Innocence Project in stating that “unreliable forensic evidence is a leading cause of wrongful convictions, contributing to nearly half of the wrongful convictions that have been overturned by DNA exonerations.” Id. at 16 (citing Unvalidated or Improper Forensic Science, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes-wrongful-conviction/ unvalidatedor-improper-forensic-science [http://perma.cc/3F22-WVDM] (last visited Sept. 27, 2015)).
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standards blithely cite to the language of Rule 702 without acknowledging how their rulings contradict the Rule’s intended meaning.
Finally, Part IV proposes specific revisions to the language of Rule
702 that will remove any perceived ambiguity about trial courts’
gatekeeping responsibility against unreliable expert testimony.
Hopefully, this will finally put an end to the judicial resistance to
gatekeeping that has persisted since the Supreme Court decided
Daubert.
I. THE 2000 AMENDMENTS TO RULE 702
The process that led to the 2000 amendments of Rule 702 began
in early 1993, when Chief Justice Rehnquist established and
appointed members to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee
on Evidence Rules.51 During public meetings on May 9 and 10, 1994,
and October 17 and 18, 1994, the Committee discussed at length the
rules on expert discovery.52 The Committee unanimously concluded
that it was “too early to determine whether Daubert [would] curb[ ]
abuses in the use of expert testimony” and that a valid assessment
of Daubert’s effects could be made only “after courts acquire[d] more
experience with it.”53 The Committee decided to “continue to study
the operation and effect of [Rule 702] as construed under Daubert by
the courts.”54
In January 1995, the newly elected Republican majority in the
U.S. House of Representatives proposed its own amendment to Rule
702 as part of its Contract with America.55 In relevant part, the proposed amendment would have added the following language to the
end of the existing Rule:
(b) Adequate basis for opinion.—Testimony in the form of an
opinion by a witness that is based on scientific knowledge shall
51. See Letter from Judge Ralph K. Winter, Chairman, Advisory Comm. on Evidence
Rules, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S., to the
Hon. Carlos J. Moorhead, Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop., House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (Feb. 7, 1995), in H.R. REP. No. 104-62, at 18-20 (1995)
[hereinafter Winter Letter].
52. Id. at 18.
53. Id. at 19.
54. Id.
55. See Attorney Accountability Act of 1995, H.R. 998, 104th Cong. § 3.
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be inadmissible in evidence unless the court determines that
such opinion—
(1) is scientifically valid and reliable;
(2) has a valid scientific connection to the fact it is offered to prove; and
(3) is sufficiently reliable so that the probative value of
such evidence outweighs the dangers specified in rule 403.56

The proposed new subdivision (b) would not apply to criminal proceedings.57
On January 9 and 10, 1995, the Advisory Committee on Evidence
Rules considered the proposed congressional amendment to Rule
702.58 As set forth in a letter from its Chair, U.S. Circuit Judge
Ralph Winter, the Committee opposed the proposed amendment as
being both too narrow and too broad.59 The Committee believed the
amendment was too narrow because it was limited to “scientific
knowledge” and accordingly would not extend to other types of
technical and specialized knowledge.60 The Committee believed the
amendment was too broad because it imposed a new requirement of
scientific “validity” that was not set forth in Daubert and that would
“impose[ ] an ill-defined burden on the courts.”61 The Committee also
expressed concern that the proposed amendment reversed the balancing test in Rule 403 by permitting admission of expert testimony
only if “the probative value of [the proffered opinion] outweighs the
dangers specified in Rule 403” (as opposed to the existing Rule 403
test, which allows exclusion of evidence only if “the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury” substantially outweighs the probative value).62 Judge Winter concluded his
letter by urging Congress to instead follow the process set forth under the Rules Enabling Act and allow any amendment to Rule 702
to be addressed in the first instance by the Judicial Conference.63
56. Id.
57. Id. A separate proposed subdivision (c) would have prohibited experts from being compensated contingent on the outcome of the litigation. Id.
58. Winter Letter, supra note 51, at 19.
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 20.
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The proposed House amendment to Rule 702 was not enacted, but
congressional interest in amending Rule 702 continued.64 In response to this potential congressional action, the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules agreed during its April 14 and 15, 1997
meeting to revisit the question of whether Rule 702 should be
amended.65 On September 11, 1997, the Advisory Committee’s Reporter, Professor Dan Capra, prepared a memorandum setting forth
various policy questions for the Committee’s consideration and
reviewing a number of potential models for an amended Rule 702.66
Professor Capra raised one key question:
Should the Daubert test apply only to the principles upon which
the expert bases her testimony, or should Rule 702 also require
that the application of the principles must be reliable as well?
For example, with DNA tests, is it only necessary to show that
the technique of DNA identification is reliable, or must it also be
shown that the test was reliably conducted in the specific case?67

In his review of various potential models for the amended Rule, Professor Capra repeatedly stated his preference that Rule 702 address
the reliability of the application of the expert’s method as well as the
method itself.68
At its subsequent meeting on October 20 and 21, 1997, the “[Advisory] Committee agreed unanimously that there [was] ... enough
case law—and conflicts among the courts—to justify consideration
of an amendment to ... Rule 702.”69 The Advisory Committee further
agreed to a number of general principles to guide the amendment
process, including, inter alia, (1) “[t]he amendment must cover not
64. See Civil Justice Fairness Act of 1997, S. 79, 105th Cong. (Jan. 21, 1997). Section 302,
“Honesty in Evidence,” generally paralleled the House’s proposed 1995 amendments to Rule
702. Id. § 302.
65. See MAY 1, 1999 REPORT, supra note 28, at 4.
66. See Memorandum from Dan Capra, Reporter to Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules,
to Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules (Sept. 11, 1997), http://www.uscourts.gove/rulespolicies/archives/agenda-books/advisory-committee-rules-evidence-october-1997 [http://perma.
cc/BU5T-W68K].
67. Id. at 2.
68. See id. at 6, 10, 14, 17, 19, 31, 34, 35.
69. See DEC. 1, 1997 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE RULES TO
THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 4, http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules-policies/archives/agenda-books/advisory-committee-rules-evidence-october-1997
[http://perma.cc/6XAW-QNDE] [hereinafter DEC. 1, 1997 REPORT].
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only the theories employed by the expert, but also the application of
those theories to the specific facts of the case,” and (2) “[a]ny
amendment to Evidence Rule 703, concerning the use of inadmissible information by an expert, would be related to and should be
considered together with any amendment to Rule 702.”70 The
Advisory Committee appointed a subcommittee to prepare a
proposal to amend Rule 702.71
On February 16, 1998, the subcommittee submitted a proposed
Rule 702 amendment to the Advisory Committee.72 The subcommittee’s proposed amendment to Rule 702 read as follows:
If scientific, technical, or other[wise] specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, provided (1) the
testimony is adequately based upon reliable underlying facts,
data or opinions; (2) the testimony is based upon reliable
principles and methodology; and (3) the principles and methodology employed by the witness have been applied reliably to the
facts of the case.73

The subcommittee’s proposed Advisory Committee Note provided
further explanation for the amended language.74 As relevant here,
the subcommittee explained that (1) “[t]he amendment specifically
provides that the trial court must scrutinize not only the methodology that was used by the expert, but also whether the methodology
has been properly applied to the facts of the case,”75 (2) “an analysis
of the expert’s basis cannot be divorced from the ultimate reliability
of the expert’s opinion.... [and that] the question of whether the
expert is relying on an adequate and reliable basis of information—whether admissible information or not—is governed by the
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See Memorandum from Dan Capra, Reporter, Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, to
Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules (Feb. 16, 1998), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/
archives/agenda-books/advisory-committee-rules-evidence-april-1998 [http://perma.cc/ T4P4AFSF] [hereinafter Feb. 16, 1998 Memorandum].
73. Id. at 2.
74. See id. at 7-10.
75. Id. at 7.
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reliability requirement of Rule 702,”76 and (3) “[t]he amendment
does not distinguish between scientific and other forms of expert
testimony.... [but noted that] [s]ome expert testimony will be more
objectively verifiable, and subject to the expectations of falsifiability,
peer review, and publication.”77 The subcommittee further explained
that under the amended Rule 702, “[t]he trial court’s gatekeeper
function requires more than simply ‘taking the expert’s word for
it.’”78
On April 6 and 7, 1998, with minor stylistic edits, the Advisory
Committee “recommend[ed] that the proposed amendment ... be
approved for public comment.”79 The Advisory Committee held a
public hearing on the proposed amendment on October 22, 1998,
and sent the proposed rule back to Professor Capra for further
consideration in light of the received comments.80 The Advisory
Committee also noted that the Supreme Court had agreed to hear
argument in Kumho Tire on the question of whether the Daubert
gatekeeping requirement applied to testimony of nonscientific
experts, a decision that had the potential to affect the proposed
amendment.81
On March 1, 1999, Professor Capra reported back to the Advisory
Committee with his responses to the public comments.82 A full
accounting of the comments and responses exceeds the scope of this
Article, but a few of Professor Capra’s statements are pertinent.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 10.
Id. at 8-9.
Id. at 9.
See MAY 1, 1998 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE RULES TO THE
STANDING COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 2, http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules-policies/archives/committee-reports/advisory-committee-rules-evidence-may-1998
[http://perma.cc/F343-WHLD] [hereinafter MAY 1, 1998 REPORT]. The one potentially substantive change was to subpart (1), in which the word “adequately” was changed to “sufficiently”
and the reference in that same subsection to opinions was removed. See id. at 8. This
language was further revised in the drafting process. See infra text accompanying notes 87-97.
80. See DEC. 1, 1998 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE RULES TO THE
STANDING COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 1, 3, http://www.uscourts.
gov/rules-policies/archives/committee-reports/advisory-committee-rules-evidence-december1998 [http://perma.cc/B3DM-BXLY] [hereinafter DEC. 1, 1998 REPORT].
81. Id. at 3.
82. See Memorandum from Dan Capra, Reporter to Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules,
to Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules (Mar. 1, 1999), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/
archives/agenda-books/advisory-committee-rules-evidence-april-1999 [http://perma.cc/ 9TQYGJVB] [hereinafter Mar. 1, 1999 Memorandum].
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First, Professor Capra expressly rejected the view of those commentators who argued against any amendment to Rule 702.83 He stated
that “[t]hese commentators tend[ed] to overstate the existence of
post-Daubert uniformity” and explained that the proposed rule
would clarify that gatekeepers are required “to determine that the
expert’s methods are reliably applied to the facts of the case” and
that an expert’s “methodology and conclusion cannot be neatly
divorced.”84 Professor Capra explained further:
[E]ven without any obvious conflicts on the specifics, the courts
have divided over how to even approach a Daubert question.
Some courts seem to approach Daubert as a rigorous exercise
requiring the trial court to scrutinize, in detail, the expert’s
basis, methods, and application. Other courts seem to think that
all Daubert requires is that the trial court assure itself that the
expert’s opinion is something more than mere unfounded speculation—all other possible defects go to the jury.85

Professor Capra stated that “[a]doption of the proposed rule change,
and the Committee Note, would likely help to provide uniformity in
the approach to Daubert questions,” because “[t]he proposed amendment and the Committee Note clearly envision[ed] a more rigorous
and structured approach than some courts were currently employing.”86
Professor Capra spent a significant amount of time discussing
comments on the subpart of the proposed rule that addressed the
trial court’s gatekeeping responsibility with respect to the facts
relied upon as a basis for the expert testimony.87 That subpart required that “expert testimony must be sufficiently based on reliable
facts or data.”88 The comments focused on the fact that Rule 703
separately required the trial judge to screen the reliability of
inadmissible evidence used by an expert and the concern that the
proposed subpart of Rule 702, as worded, would require the judge to

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See id. at 47-48.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 47-48.
Id. at 48.
See id. at 30-45.
Id. at 30.
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screen the reliability of admissible evidence and thus invade the
province of the jury.89
Professor Capra allowed that:
The fact that there are so many competing interpretations about
the relationship between Subpart (1) and Rule 703 is cause for
concern. At the very least, the relationship between “reliable
facts or data” in Subpart (1) and inadmissible information of “a
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field” in
Rule 703 is a complex one, possibly leading to costs in terms of
confusion and misapplication.90

He also expressed his belief that the other subparts of Rule 702 and
Rule 703 already required the courts to screen the reliability of the
factual foundation of expert testimony, stating that “it is hard to see
what kind of unreliable basis of information might slip through the
cracks of those provisions that would need to be regulated by a
separate reliability requirement (as opposed to a sufficiency requirement) in Subpart (1).”91 Professor Capra thus proposed alternative
language for Subpart (1) that would require the trial court to engage
in a quantitative analysis to ensure that the expert had relied on
enough data—for example, the expert had not excluded something
from consideration that he should have included—leaving the qualitative analysis of the reliability of facts and data to Rule 703.92
Accordingly, Subpart (1) was modified to its current language,
removing the word “reliable” and requiring only that testimony be
based on “sufficient facts or data.”93
On April 12 and 13, 1999, the Advisory Committee recommended
that the proposed amendment to Rule 702, as modified, be approved
and forwarded to the Judicial Conference.94 The Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure approved the proposed
amendment to Rule 702 and forwarded it to the Judicial Conference,
which approved the Rule on September 15, 1999.95 Rule 702 was
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id. at 31.
Id.
Id. at 32-41.
FED. R. EVID. 702(b).
MAY 1, 1999 REPORT, supra note 28, at 1, 7.
REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
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subsequently amended by order of the Supreme Court and submitted to Congress on April 17, 2000.96 The new rule took effect on December 1, 2000.97
II. JUDICIAL DISREGARD OF AMENDED RULE 702
As the Supreme Court has long asserted, including in Daubert
itself, the Federal Rules of Evidence are interpreted like any other
statute.98 The first and most important step in interpreting any
statute, including any Federal Rule of Evidence, is to start with the
statutory language.99 Nevertheless, federal courts often ignore the
language of amended Rule 702 when determining whether to uphold
a district court decision excluding expert testimony. Other courts
pay lip service to the Rule by quoting its language but then proceed
to ignore its text for the remainder of the opinion.
Consider the Eighth Circuit case Johnson v. Mead Johnson & Co.,
decided almost fourteen years after amended Rule 702 went into
effect.100 The district court excluded the plaintiff’s experts’ testimony
in a case alleging that the plaintiff was injured as an infant by
contaminated baby formula.101 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit began
by acknowledging that Rule 702 governs the admissibility of expert
testimony.102 But then, instead of addressing the language of Rule
702, the court stated that “[t]he screening requirement of Rule 702
has been boiled down to a three-part test:”

75-76 (Sept. 15, 1999).
96. See Order Amending the Federal Rules of Evidence, 529 U.S. 1189, 1195 (2000).
97. Id. at 1191.
98. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993) (citing Beech Aircraft
Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 163 (1988)).
99. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317, 322 (1992) (relying on the plain
meaning of “testimony” in reaching the conclusion that Rule 804(b)(1) “applies only to sworn
statements”); United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 566 (1989) (rejecting an interpretation of
Rule 104(a) that would be inconsistent with its “plain language”). See generally Salerno, 505
U.S. at 322 (“To respect [Congress’s] determination, we must enforce the words that it enacted.”); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Response, Whether the Federal Rules of Evidence Should
Be Conceived as a Perpetual Index Code: Blindness Is Worse than Myopia, 40 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1595, 1595-98 (1999) (explaining and defending the Supreme Court’s treatment of the
Federal Rules of Evidence as a statute).
100. 754 F.3d 557 (8th Cir. 2014).
101. Id. at 557.
102. Id. at 561.
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First, evidence based on scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge must be useful to the finder of fact in deciding the
ultimate issue of fact. This is the basic rule of relevancy. Second,
the proposed witness must be qualified to assist the finder of
fact. Third, the proposed evidence must be reliable or trustworthy in an evidentiary sense, so that, if the finder of fact accepts
it as true, it provides the assistance the finder of fact requires.103

In adopting this understanding of Rule 702, the court quoted a 2008
opinion, Polski v. Quigley Corp.,104 which in turn quoted Lauzon v.
Senco Products, Inc.,105 from 2001, which in turn quoted an evidence
treatise coauthored by the late Professor Margaret Berger,106 a leading critic of stricter rules for the admissibility of expert testimony.107
While the Eighth Circuit’s formulation in Lauzon was hardly sufficient to “boil down” parts (1) through (3) of amended Rule 702,108
at least the court then had acknowledged:
[t]he basis for the third prerequisite lies in the recent amendment of Rule 702, which adds the following language to the former rule: “(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or
data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and
methods reliably to the facts of the case.”109

Thirteen years later in Johnson, however, Rule 702's language was
ignored altogether, and Berger’s formulation became the relevant
law110—as if a three-sentence summary in a legal treatise has more
weight than the text of the statute it purports to be summarizing.
Still, Johnson could have applied the Berger formulation rigorously, and therefore consistently with Rule 702. Instead, the court
asserted that “Daubert and Rule 702 ... greatly liberalized what had
been the strict Frye standards for admission of expert scientific
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
538 F.3d 836, 839 (8th Cir. 2008).
270 F.3d 681, 686 (8th Cir. 2001).
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 26, § 702.02[3].
See, e.g., Margaret A. Berger, What Has a Decade of Daubert Wrought?, 95 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH S59, S61-62, S64-65 (2005).
108. Johnson, 754 F.3d at 561.
109. Lauzon, 270 F.3d at 686 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702).
110. See Johnson, 754 F.3d at 561.
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testimony.”111 Indeed, the court used variations of the word “liberal”
to describe its admissibility standards four different times.112 And
once again, the court cited to a line of authority building on Lauzon,
in which the court had asserted that “Rule 702 reflects an attempt
to liberalize the rules governing the admission of expert testimony.”113 Lauzon, in turn, quoted the 1999 Eighth Circuit case
Weisgram v. Marley Co.114 Weisgram cited to Arcoren v. United
States,115 decided in 1991, not only before Rule 702 was amended,
but also before the Supreme Court established the reliability test in
Daubert. Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court, in affirming Weisgram, took pains to disagree with the Eighth Circuit’s assessment
of Daubert, remarking instead that Daubert establishes “exacting
standards of reliability.”116
The Johnson court then proceeded to make a mockery of the
abuse-of-discretion standard of review it was supposed to be applying to the district court’s exclusion of the evidence. Applying that
standard should have created a strong presumption in favor of
upholding the district court decision. Instead, Johnson paid lip
service to abuse-of-discretion, but then suggested, as several courts
did right after Daubert, that opinions that exclude plaintiffs’ evidence get less deference because they conflict with Daubert’s “liberal
thrust.”117 The court wrote:
Interestingly, the liberalization of the standard for admission of
expert testimony creates an intriguing juxtaposition with our
oft-repeated abuse-of-discretion standard of review. While we
adhere to this discretionary standard for review of the district
court’s Rule 702 gatekeeping decision, cases are legion that, correctly, under Daubert, call for the liberal admission of expert
testimony.118

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 562.
Id.
Lauzon, 270 F.3d at 686.
169 F.3d 514, 523 (8th Cir. 1999), aff’d, 528 U.S. 440 (2000).
929 F.2d 1235, 1239 (8th Cir. 1991).
Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000).
Johnson, 754 F.3d at 562.
Id.
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In other words, the court implied that it did not defer to the
district court’s opinion because that court failed to apply a liberal
admissibility standard.119 In so doing, Johnson not only acted contrary to the “exacting” thrust of the Daubert trilogy and amended
Rule 702, but it also made the same error the Supreme Court explicitly corrected in Joiner. In Joiner, the Court explicitly rejected the
Eleventh Circuit’s claim that the standard of review of district court
opinions should be more stringent when considering opinions that
exclude expert evidence.120
When a court egregiously misstates the law of expert testimony
in this fashion, one is tempted to assume that the party that moved
to have the relevant testimony excluded briefed the issue poorly.
That is not what happened in Johnson.121 Mead Johnson’s brief not
only quoted the language of amended Rule 702, but also specifically
analyzed admissibility through the language of the Rule, step by
step.122 The Eighth Circuit’s opinion, therefore, seems like a willful
refusal to be governed by the relevant legal standard.
The Ninth Circuit similarly disregarded amended Rule 702 in
City of Pomona v. SQM North America Corp.123 Unlike Johnson, the
Ninth Circuit began its discussion of the admissibility of expert
testimony by quoting Rule 702.124 The court nonetheless proceeded
to ignore the Rule thereafter, in favor of its own interpretation of
what it deemed “Daubert[’s] liberal standard” that allows district
courts to exclude only “nonsense opinions.”125 More generally, as in
Johnson, the court seemed to apply something more akin to de novo
than to abuse-of-discretion review of the district court’s decision to
exclude the plaintiff’s evidence.
The court ultimately asserted a wildly incorrect legal rule, to wit,
“only a faulty methodology or theory, as opposed to imperfect execu119. See id.
120. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143 (1997).
121. See Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 48-50, Johnson v. Mead Johnson & Co., 754 F.3d
557 (8th Cir. 2014) (No. 13-1685), 2013 WL 3913931, at *18-20.
122. Id.
123. 750 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2014).
124. Id. at 1043.
125. Id. at 1044, 1049. The Eighth Circuit has similarly asserted that “[o]nly if the expert’s
opinion is so fundamentally unsupported that it can offer no assistance to the jury must such
testimony be excluded.” Bonner v. ISP Techs., Inc., 259 F.3d 924, 929-30 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hose v. Chi. Nw. Transp. Co., 70 F.3d 968, 974 (8th Cir. 1996)). This was not a correct
statement of the law even in 1995, much less after Rule 702 was amended in 2000.
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tion of laboratory techniques, is a valid basis to exclude expert
testimony.”126 This error is discussed in further detail later in this
Article.127
As with the Ninth Circuit in SQM North America, in Milward v.
Acuity Specialty Products Group, Inc. in 2011, the First Circuit perfunctorily quoted the text of amended Rule 702 and then ignored the
Rule when analyzing the admissibility of the plaintiffs’ expert
testimony.128 Instead of treating Rule 702 as the governing standard
for the admissibility of expert testimony, Milward quoted a post2000 First Circuit opinion, United States v. Vargas, for the proposition that “weak” expert testimony should be admitted for jury
consideration.129 Vargas, meanwhile, had not only ignored the text
of amended Rule 702, but also Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho Tire.
Instead, Vargas relied on a case from 1988, five years before the revolutionary changes to the admissibility of expert testimony brought
about by Daubert.130
Even though the Milward court acknowledged significant weaknesses in the expert testimony at issue, and even though the court
was supposed to be applying an abuse-of-discretion standard, it reversed the district court’s exclusion of the testimony.131 The court
explained, consistent with the state of the law in 1988, but not with
amended Rule 702, “[w]hen the factual underpinning of an expert’s
opinion is weak, it is a matter affecting the weight and credibility of
the testimony—a question to be resolved by the jury.”132
Perhaps the worst example of a federal appellate court ignoring
the language of amended Rule 702 arose in the 2006 Federal Circuit
opinion in Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co.133 In this case, the
court never referenced the text of Rule 702, or, for that matter,
showed an awareness that Rule 702, as amended in 2000, was the
governing rule for the admissibility of expert testimony.134 The court
cited Daubert as the last word on the scope of Rule 702, ignoring
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

SQM N. Am. Corp., 750 F.3d at 1048.
See infra Part III.A.
See 639 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2011).
Id. at 22 (quoting United States v. Vargas, 471 F.3d 255, 264 (1st Cir. 2006)).
Id.
Id. at 13, 20-24, 26.
Id. at 22.
449 F.3d 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
See id.
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both the text of amended Rule 702 and Joiner.135 To justify its ruling, the court cited a 1986 Eighth Circuit opinion for the proposition
that inadequacies in expert testimony are a matter of weight, not
admissibility.136 The court also cited an equally wrongheaded post2000 Eleventh Circuit opinion that relied on the same 1986 precedent to state that an objection to the reliability of an expert’s
testimony goes only to weight, not admissibility.137
Speaking of the Eleventh Circuit, in a 2011 case, Rosenfeld v.
Oceania Cruises, Inc., the court quoted a 2004 case, which in turn
quoted a 1998 case, as establishing the following test for the admissibility of expert testimony:
(1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the
matters he intends to address; (2) the methodology by which the
expert reaches his conclusions is sufficiently reliable as determined by the sort of inquiry mandated in Daubert; and (3) the
testimony assists the trier of fact, through the application of
scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue.138

If the court was aware that amended Rule 702 had since established by statute a different test for the admissibility of expert
testimony, it is not apparent from the opinion.
District court judges, whom one would expect to be especially
familiar with the vagaries of the Federal Rules of Evidence, also at
times have ignored the existence of amended Rule 702. In a multidistrict litigation (MDL) case decided in 2012, In re Chantix
(Varenicline) Products Liability Litigation, the court stated that
“Rule 702, Federal Rules of Evidence, as construed by the Supreme
Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., requires
expert scientific evidence to be both reliable and relevant pursuant
to Rule 702, such that it appropriately assists the trier of fact.”139 Of
135. Id. at 1220-21.
136. Id. at 1221 (citing Wilmington v. J.I. Case Co., 793 F.2d 909, 920 (8th Cir. 1986)).
137. Id. (citing Quiet Tech. DC-8, Inc. V. Hurel-Dubois UK Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333, 1343-44
(11th Cir. 2003))
138. 654 F.3d 1190, 1193 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244,
1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 562
(11th Cir. 1998))).
139. 889 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1279 (N.D. Ala. 2012) (citation omitted).
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course, the 2012 version of Rule 702 could not have been construed
in Daubert, given that Daubert was decided more than seven years
before that Rule came into existence. Not surprisingly, the court
never cited the text of Rule 702, despite many citations to other
material.140
In another recent case, a judge supervising MDL cited a circuit
court case from 1999 as a binding interpretation of Rule 702 and
ignored the language of the current Rule. 141 The MDL judge
stated:
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 reads: “[I]f scientific, technical or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient fact or
data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods; and (3) the witness has applied the principles and
methods reliably to the facts.” The Third Circuit has distilled
this rule to two essential inquiries: 1) is the proffered expert
qualified to express an expert opinion; and 2) is the expert opinion reliable?142

Of course, in the 1999 case, the Third Circuit could not have distilled amended Rule 702's language into that test, because Rule 702
had yet to be amended. So one can only assume that the MDL judge
was unaware that Rule 702 had been completely rewritten.
III. CONTINUED DIVISIONS IN THE COURTS OVER THE SCREENING
OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
Due in part to many courts’ resistance to the 2000 amendments
to Rule 702, the conflicts over Daubert that the Advisory Committee
sought to resolve have continued to fester. Moreover, in recent
years, a number of courts have strayed dramatically afield from the
140. See id. at 1272-1304.
141. In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2007-MD-1871, 2011
WL 13576, at *1-2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2011).
142. Id. at *1 (alteration in original) (quoting In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 664 (3d Cir.
1999)).
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core principles of expert reliability embraced in the Daubert trilogy.
This Section focuses on three key areas of continued division in the
courts.
A. Conflict over the Requirement that an Expert Reliably Apply
His Principles and Methods to the Facts of the Case
The 2000 amendments to Rule 702 were unquestionably intended
to resolve any dispute over whether trial courts must screen out
testimony that does not reliably apply the expert’s principles and
methods to the facts of the case. The Advisory Committee identified
this requirement as one of its guiding principles from its very first
meeting on the potential Rule amendment in the fall of 1997,143 and
it reemphasized the need for such judicial scrutiny at every stage of
the amendment process.144 The Advisory Committee codified this
requirement in Rule 702(d), and it made clear in its 2000 Advisory
Committee Notes that “[t]he amendment specifically provides that
the trial court must scrutinize not only the principles and methods
used by the expert, but also whether those principles and methods
have been properly applied to the facts of the case.”145
The requirement that an expert witness reliably apply his
methodology to the facts is essential to a trial court’s gatekeeping
function.146 The most reliable methodology can lead to nonsensical
results if applied in an erroneous fashion. Indeed, it is the ability of
experts to misuse seemingly reliable methods to reach a preordained result—and the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
143. See Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, Minutes of the Meeting of Oct. 20-21,
1997, at 6, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/meeting-minutes/advisorycommittee-rules-evidence-october-1997 [http://perma.cc/3J6H-TBMG].
144. See DEC. 1, 1997 REPORT, supra note 69, at 4; Feb. 16, 1998 Memorandum, supra note
72, at 1, 7; MAY 1, 1998 REPORT, supra note 79, at 2; DEC. 1, 1998 REPORT, supra note 80, at
3; Mar. 1, 1999 Memorandum, supra note 82, at 47; Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules,
Minutes of the Meeting of Apr. 12-13, 1999, at 5, http://www.uscourts.gov/ rules-policies/
archives/meeting-minutes/advisory-committee-rules-evidence-april-1999 [http://perma.cc /
K46G-CS2S]; MAY 1, 1999 REPORT, supra note 28, at 7.
145. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment (emphasis added).
146. See Joëlle Anne Moreno, What Happens When Dirty Harry Becomes an (Expert) Witness for the Prosecution?, 79 TUL. L. REV. 1, 11 n.48 (2004) (criticizing a federal court for
“redefining the reliability of an expert’s application of his methods to the facts, which should
fall squarely within the judge’s purview, as a question of ‘persuasiveness,’” which goes only
to weight).

2015]

DEFENDING DAUBERT

27

issues, or misleading the jury from such scientifically cloaked evidence—that caused the Supreme Court to charge district courts
with a gatekeeping responsibility.147 As the Supreme Court explained in Kumho Tire, the issue before a trial court is not simply
“the reasonableness in general” of an expert’s methodology but also
the expert’s “particular method of analyzing the data thereby
obtained, to draw a conclusion regarding the particular matter to
which the expert testimony was directly relevant.”148 Indeed, Kumho
Tire expressly endorsed the Advisory Committee’s then-draft note
on this issue in the proposed amendment to Rule 702, “stressing
that district courts must scrutinize whether the principles and
methods employed by an expert have been properly applied to the
facts of the case.”149
Notwithstanding the clear intent—and the Supreme Court’s
stated approval—of this requirement in Rule 702(d), a number of
courts continue to insist that the review of an expert’s application
of his methodology is beyond the scope of a court’s gatekeeping
power. Most notably, in SQM North America, the Ninth Circuit
recently held that a district court abused its discretion by excluding
an expert for failing to reliably apply his stated methodology.150 The
Ninth Circuit held that the district court had erred because “only a
faulty methodology or theory, as opposed to imperfect execution of
laboratory techniques, is a valid basis to exclude expert testimony.”151 The Ninth Circuit allowed that its holding was in conflict
with the Third Circuit’s holding in In re Paoli that “any step that
renders the analysis unreliable ... renders the expert’s testimony
inadmissible ... whether the step completely changes a reliable
147. See FED. R. EVID. 403. Given the existence of adversarial bias, there is no reason to
expect that, left unsupervised by the courts, experts hired by the parties will present testimony that represents the range of opinions one would get by consulting nonpartisan experts.
See David E. Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, Adversarial Bias, and the (Partial) Failure of the
Daubert Revolution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 451, 452-58 (2008).
148. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 153-54 (1999); see also Gen. Elec. Co. v.
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 144 (1997) (rejecting plaintiff’s contention that “the only issue [was]
whether animal studies can ever be a proper foundation for an expert opinion”).
149. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 156-57 (quoting Proposed FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and Evidence: Request for Comment, 181 F.R.D. 18, 148 (1998)).
150. City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 750 F.3d 1036, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 2014).
151. Id. at 1048 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1154
(9th Cir. 1994)).
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methodology or merely misapplies that methodology.”152 But the
court concluded that Ninth Circuit law was to the contrary, citing
an earlier ruling of that court from 1994.153
As previously discussed, SQM North America is the poster child
for judicial disregard of the 2000 amendments to Rule 702.154 Not
only does it rely on an opinion that pre-dates the 2000 amendments,
but it completely disregards the Advisory Committee’s Note to the
2000 amendments, which expressly endorses the exact “any step”
approach from In re Paoli that the Ninth Circuit rejects.155 Unfortunately, however, while many courts have properly excluded expert
testimony that does not apply a potentially reliable methodology in
a reliable manner,156 SQM North America does not stand alone.
Just two weeks after the Supreme Court approved the amendments to Rule 702 in April 2000, the First Circuit affirmed a district
court’s holding that “any flaws in [the expert’s] application of an
otherwise reliable methodology went to weight and credibility and
not to admissibility,” noting, without any acknowledgment to the
pending Rule change, that “[m]ost circuits that have spoken have
agreed with this approach.”157 The Third Circuit went astray in an
opinion in 2002 when it agreed with a defendant’s argument that
“because [plaintiff] objected to the application rather than the
legitimacy of [the expert’s] methodology, such objections were more
152. Id. at 1047 (quoting In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994)).
Other federal circuit courts properly have endorsed the “any steps” approach. See Paz v.
Brush Engineered Materials, Inc., 555 F.3d 383, 387-91 (5th Cir. 2009); McClain v. Metabolife
Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1245 (11th Cir. 2005); Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 328 F.3d 1212, 1222
(10th Cir. 2003); Amorgianos v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 267 (2d Cir. 2002)
(quoting In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 746 (3d Cir. 1994)).
153. SQM N. Am. Corp., 750 F.3d at 1047-48 (citing United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d
1144, 1154 & n.11 (9th Cir. 1994)).
154. See supra notes 32-33, 123-26 and accompanying text.
155. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment. Indeed, in an article
published shortly after the 2000 amendments went into effect, the Committee Reporter,
Professor Capra, pointed to In re Paoli and its “any step” analysis as having a “profound
impact” on the drafting of amended Rule 702. Stephen A. Saltzburg, Edwin J. Imwinkelried,
& Daniel J. Capra, Keeping the Reformist Spirit Alive in Evidence Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1277, 1289-90 (2001).
156. See, e.g., Kilpatrick v. Breg, Inc., 613 F.3d 1329, 1343 (11th Cir. 2010) (affirming exclusion of expert testimony for unreliable application of differential diagnosis methodology
notwithstanding that differential diagnosis has been recognized as a valid and reliable methodology).
157. United States v. Shea, 211 F.3d 658, 668 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing United States v.
Johnson, 56 F.3d 947, 952-53 (8th Cir. 1995)).

2015]

DEFENDING DAUBERT

29

appropriately addressed on cross-examination and no Daubert hearing was required.”158 The Eleventh Circuit likewise erred in a 2003
opinion in which the court found it “important to be mindful of a
distinction ... between the reliability of [a methodology] generally
and of [the expert’s] application of [the methodology] in this case”159
and then rejected a Daubert challenge based on the latter, relying
remarkably on a Supreme Court opinion that pre-dated Daubert by
seven years.160 And the Eighth Circuit has also “drawn a distinction
between, on the one hand, challenges to a scientific methodology,
and, on the other hand, challenges to the application of that scientific methodology.”161 Relying on preamendment authority, the
Eighth Circuit imposed an additional hurdle to challenges to an
expert’s application of his method that is found nowhere in amended
Rule 702: “[W]hen the application of a scientific methodology is
challenged as unreliable under Daubert and the methodology itself
is otherwise sufficiently reliable, outright exclusion of the evidence
in question is warranted only if the methodology was so altered by
a deficient application as to skew the methodology itself.”162
Surveying this and other authority, a federal district court in
2013 noted a split of authority, but concluded that “[w]ell-reasoned
caselaw holds that a court should not review the application of a
reliable methodology under the same Daubert analysis as the methodology itself.”163 The court thus adopted what it called the “narrowest reading of Daubert,” under which “the trial judge decides the
scientific validity of underlying principles and methodology” and
that “once that validity is demonstrated, other reliability issues go
to the weight—not the admissibility—of the evidence.”164 Numerous
other federal district courts likewise have squarely held that the
reliability of an expert’s application of his methodology is an issue
reserved solely for the jury.165
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Walker v. Gordon, 46 F. App’x 691, 696 (3d Cir. 2002).
Quiet Tech. DC-8, Inc. v. Hurel-Dubois UK Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333, 1343 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1343-46.
United States v. Gipson, 383 F.3d 689, 696 (8th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 697 (alteration in original).
United States v. McCluskey, 954 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1247-48 (D.N.M. 2013).
Id. at 1254 (quoting 29 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6266, at 289 (1997 & Supp. 2012)).
165. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, No. 1:95-CV-94 TS, 2007 WL 709298, at
*2 (D. Utah Mar. 5, 2007) (“Where the Court has determined that Plaintiffs have met their
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These rulings cannot be reconciled with the clear language of
Rule 702(d) requiring trial courts to determine that “the expert has
reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the
case.”166 The Ninth Circuit’s express rejection in SQM North
America of the “any step” approach to Daubert suggests, however,
that some courts mistakenly believe they have discretion to admit
expert testimony even if one or more of the four steps set forth in
Rule 702 are not satisfied.167 Rule 702 should be amended to correct
this misimpression.
B. Conflict over the Requirement that an Expert’s Testimony Be
Based upon Facts that Reliably Support His Opinion
The Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that a trial court’s
gatekeeping responsibility in screening unreliable expert testimony
requires the court to assess the reliability of the factual foundations
of such testimony. In Daubert, the Court explained that “the Rules
of Evidence ... assign to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an
expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.”168 The Court noted that “a judge assessing
a proffer of expert scientific testimony under Rule 702 should also
be mindful of [Rule 703],” which then provided—as it continues to
provide today with only stylistic revision—“that expert opinions
based on otherwise inadmissible hearsay are to be admitted only if
the facts or data are ‘of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in

burden of showing that the methodology is reliable, the expert’s application of the
methodology and his or her conclusions are issues of credibility for the jury.”); Oshana v. CocaCola Co., No. 04 C 3596, 2005 WL 1661999, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 13, 2005) (“Challenges addressing flaws in an expert’s application of reliable methodology may be raised on crossexamination.”); United States v. Adam Bros. Farming, No. CV-00-7409 CAS (RNBx), 2005 WL
5957827, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2005) (“Defendants’ objections are to the accuracy of the
expert’s application of the methodology, not the methodology itself, and as such are properly
reserved for cross-examination.”).
166. FED. R. EVID. 702(d).
167. See also McCluskey, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 1247 (concluding that the “any step” requirement is directed solely at whether there is a sufficient connection between the conclusions and
data, which is “a different issue from the level of scrutiny for reviewing the application of a
reliable methodology”).
168. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
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the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject.’”169
Four years later, in Joiner, the Court undertook its own detailed
analysis of the reliability of the factual predicate of expert testimony, separately scrutinizing and finding unreliable the animal
studies and four epidemiology studies upon which the plaintiffs’
experts based their opinion that PCBs caused small-cell lung
cancer.170 And in Kumho Tire, the Court stated that “where [an expert’s] testimony’s factual basis, data, principles, methods, or their
application are called sufficiently into question ... the trial judge
must determine whether the testimony has ‘a reliable basis in the
knowledge and experience of [the relevant] discipline.’”171 The Court
thus reversed a circuit court opinion that had rejected a trial court’s
exclusion of factually unfounded expert testimony.172 In reinstating
the trial court’s holding, the Court expressly upheld that court’s
findings of faulty factual predicates to the expert’s opinion.173
It is clear that the Advisory Committee in its 2000 amendments
likewise intended for trial courts to assess the reliability of the factual foundation of expert testimony.174 The Committee believed,
however, that proposed Rules 702(c), 702(d) and 703 adequately
addressed the requirement of a reliable factual foundation. As
Professor Capra stated, “it is hard to see what kind of unreliable
basis of information might slip through the cracks.”175 The Committee accordingly focused in Rule 702(b) on the quantitative question
of whether expert testimony “is based on sufficient facts or data.”176
Fifteen years later, it is clear that this drafting decision was a
mistake. Despite the direction in Daubert that Rule 702 be read in
169. Id. at 595.
170. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 144-46 (1997).
171. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999) (emphasis added) (quoting
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592).
172. Id. at 154, 157-58.
173. See id. at 154 (expert opinion as to alleged tire defect predicated on the fact that the
tire was not abused “despite some evidence of the presence of the very signs [of abuse] for
which he looked (and two punctures)”); id. at 155 (pointing to expert’s statement that the
remaining tread depth on the tire “‘was 3/32 inch,’ though the opposing expert’s (apparently
undisputed) measurements indicate[d] that the tread depth taken at various positions around
the tire actually ranged from .5/32 of an inch to 4/32 of an inch”) (citation omitted).
174. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
175. See Mar. 1, 1999 Memorandum, supra note 82, at 31.
176. FED. R. EVID. 702(b) (emphasis added).
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tandem with Rule 703, Rule 703 is frequently ignored in Daubert
analyses. And, as noted above, many courts do not follow the plain
language of Rule 702(d), let alone the Advisory Committee’s intent
that a trial court’s review of the reliability of the application of an
expert’s methodology encompass a review of the expert’s factual
predicate. As a result, while many courts properly exclude expert
testimony based upon a lack of a reliable factual foundation, other
courts routinely allow such unfounded testimony to be admitted
before the jury.
Cases from the Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits properly
understand that Rule 702 requires trial courts to analyze the facts
underlying expert testimony. As these circuits have explained, the
“suggestion that the reasonableness of an expert’s reliance on facts
or data to form his opinion is somehow an inappropriate inquiry
under Rule 702 results from an unduly myopic interpretation of
Rule 702 and ignores the mandate of Daubert that the district court
must act as a gatekeeper.”177 These cases properly recognize that:
In deciding whether a step in an expert’s analysis is unreliable,
the district court should undertake a rigorous examination of the
facts on which the expert relies, the method by which the expert
draws an opinion from those facts, and how the expert applies
the facts and methods to the case at hand.178

Trial courts “may, indeed must, look beyond the conclusions [of the
experts] to determine whether the expert testimony rests on a reliable foundation.”179 For these courts, “when an expert opinion is
based on data, a methodology, or studies that are simply inadequate
to support the conclusions reached, Daubert and Rule 702 mandate
the exclusion of that unreliable opinion testimony.”180 Litigants are
thus assured that “expert testimony based on assumptions lacking
factual foundation in the record [will be] properly excluded.”181

177. ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 294 (3d Cir. 2012).
178. Amorgianos v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 267 (2d Cir. 2002).
179. Kalamazoo River Study Grp. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 171 F.3d 1065, 1072 (6th Cir.
1999) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)).
180. Ruggiero v. Warner-Lambert Co., 424 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Amorgianos, 303 F.3d at 266).
181. Meadows v. Anchor Longwall & Rebuild, Inc., 306 F. App’x 781, 790 (3d Cir. 2009).
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Decisions from other circuit courts stand on the opposite side of
this divide. Courts such as the First Circuit maintain that “[t]he
soundness of the factual underpinnings of the expert’s analysis and
the correctness of the expert’s conclusions based on that analysis are
factual matters to be determined by the trier of fact.”182 District
courts are instructed that “[t]he reliability of data and assumptions
used in applying a methodology is tested by the adversarial process
and determined by the jury; the court’s role is generally limited to
assessing the reliability of the methodology—the framework—of the
expert’s analysis.”183 Fatally misconstruing Daubert, these courts
have concluded that “the factual basis of an expert opinion goes to
the credibility of the testimony, not the admissibility, and it is up to
the opposing party to examine the factual basis for the opinion in
cross-examination.”184 Indeed, these courts have held that “[t]he
district court usurps the role of the jury, and therefore abuses its
discretion, if it unduly scrutinizes the quality of the expert’s data
and conclusions rather than the reliability of the methodology the
expert employed.”185
These latter courts’ disregard of their gatekeeping responsibility
to screen out expert testimony lacking a reliable factual foundation
indicates that the current language of Rules 702 and 703 is insufficient to fulfill the mandate of the Daubert trilogy. Rule 702(b)
should be amended to clarify this reliability requirement.
Moreover, the 2000 amendments to Rule 702(b) have been ineffective in securing a consistent quantitative analysis of the facts underlying an expert opinion. In requiring that expert testimony be
based on “sufficient facts or data,” the Advisory Committee intended, at the very least, to ensure that an expert “had not excluded
something from his consideration that he should have included.”186
But many federal courts have allowed expert witnesses to ignore the

182. Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., 639 F.3d 11, 22 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting Smith
v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713, 718 (7th Cir. 2000)).
183. Manpower, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 732 F.3d 796, 808 (7th Cir. 2013).
184. Bonner v. ISP Techs., Inc., 259 F.3d 924, 929 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hose v. Chi. Nw.
Transp. Co., 70 F.3d 968, 974 (8th Cir. 1996)).
185. Manpower, Inc., 732 F.3d at 806 (emphasis added) (citing Stollings v. Ryobi Techs.,
Inc., 725 F.3d 753, 765 (7th Cir. 2013)).
186. Mar. 1, 1999 Memorandum, supra note 82, at 32.
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scientific method and consider only studies or other data that support their side’s case.187
When an expert witness selectively considers scientific studies
that support one party’s theory of the case, while ignoring—without
adequate explanation—studies that contradict his conclusion, that
expert is not engaging in objective scientific analysis, but is instead
acting in a biased, partisan manner. Given that expert witnesses
are hired by parties to litigation, it is safe to assume that in most
cases experts who engage in such cherry-picking are trying to reach
a predetermined result favored by their employer, and thus are
acting not as experts but as advocates.
Some courts have recognized the impropriety of experts cherrypicking favorable information and ignoring the contrary when analyzing an issue, even before the 2000 amendments to Rule 702. For
example, in Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the court
affirmed the exclusion of testimony by an expert who “[saw] fit to
‘pick and chose’ [sic] from the scientific landscape and present the
Court with what he believes the final picture looks like. This is
hardly scientific.”188
A series of post-2000 decisions similarly rejected expert testimony
when the expert seemed to assume a conclusion, and then selectively relied on studies supporting that conclusion, while ignoring
contrary data.189 As district court Judge Lewis Kaplan explained,
187. See infra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
188. 89 F.3d 594, 596 (9th Cir. 1996).
189. See, e.g., EEOC v. Freeman, 798 F.3d 463, 466-67 (4th Cir. 2015); Bricklayers &
Trowel Trades Int’l Pension Fund v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 752 F.3d 82, 92 (1st Cir.
2014); Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., 647 F.3d 1247, 1252 (10th Cir. 2011), aff’g and remanding
on other grounds No. Civ 06-0874 JCH/LFG, 2009 WL 2208570, at *13 (D.N.M. July 21, 2009)
(“Even more damaging ... is [the expert’s] failure to grapple with any of the myriad epidemiological studies that refute her conclusion.”); Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v.
U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 639 F.3d 1078, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Miller v. Pfizer, Inc.,
356 F.3d 1326, 1335 (10th Cir. 2004) (upholding the exclusion of testimony by an expert witness who failed to explain why he ignored research contrary to his conclusion); Barber v.
United Airlines, Inc., 17 F. App’x 433, 437 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[S]elective use of facts fails to satisfy the scientific method and Daubert.”); In re Denture Cream Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 092051-MD, 2015 WL 392021, at *26 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 28, 2015) (rejecting expert opinion derived
from “cherry-picked data and flawed methodology”); In re Zoloft (Sertraline Hydrocloride)
Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 12-md-2342, 2015 WL 314149, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2015) (rejecting
expert opinion based on “the cherry-picking of studies and data within studies”); Reed Constr.
Data Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 49 F. Supp. 3d 385, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding that “[w]hen
constructing a benchmark statistic [for purposes of an expert’s regression analysis], the
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“[A]ny theory that fails to explain information that otherwise would
tend to cast doubt on that theory is inherently suspect,” and “courts
have excluded expert testimony ‘where the expert selectively chose
his support from the scientific landscape.’”190
As the initial wave of post-Daubert publicity about the courts’
gatekeeping role has worn off, however, courts have increasingly
allowed experts to cherry-pick studies. In 2012, for example, the
Eighth Circuit reversed a trial court that excluded the testimony of
an expert who offered an opinion that ignored contrary studies—not
to mention the witness’s own past opinions.191 The court acknowledged that the expert ignored several studies supporting the defendant’s contrary position, but concluded that “it is not the province
of the court to choose between the competing theories when both are
supported by reliable scientific evidence.”192 The court thus confused
“choosing between competing theories” with ensuring that an expert
has reached his conclusion by fairly considering all of the relevant
evidence, rather than starting with the conclusion and looking for
evidence supporting it.
Other courts have taken an even more explicitly hands-off
approach to disputes over whether expert witnesses have improperly discounted or ignored studies that might undermine their
regression analyst may not ‘cherry-pick’ the time-frame or data points”) (citing Bricklayers,
752 F.3d at 89); Fail-Safe, LLC v. A.O. Smith Corp., 744 F. Supp. 2d 870, 889 (E.D. Wis. 2010)
(“In fact, it is readily apparent that [the expert] all but ‘cherry picked’ the data he wanted to
use, providing the court with another strong reason to conclude that the witness utilized an
unreliable methodology.”) (citing Barber, 17 F. App’x at 437); In re Bausch & Lomb, Inc. Contact Lens Prods. Lia. Litig., No. 2:06-MN-77777-DCN, 2009 WL 2750462, at *14 (D.S.C. 2009)
(holding that “failure to address ... contrary data renders plaintiffs’ theory inherently unreliable”); In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 524 F. Supp. 2d
1166, 1176, 1179 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (deploring cherry-picking of an expert who “ignores the vast
majority of the evidence in favor of the few studies that support her conclusion”); LeClercq v.
Lockformer Co., No. 00 C 7164, 2005 WL 1162979, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 28, 2005) (noting that
“cherry-pick[ing]” and otherwise “selective use of facts fail[s] to satisfy the scientific method
and Daubert”) (second alteration in original); Holden Metal & Aluminum Works, Ltd. v.
Wismarq Corp., No. 00 C 0191, 2003 WL 1797844, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 3, 2003) (“Essentially,
the expert ‘cherry-picked’ the facts he considered to render his opinion, and such selective use
of facts failed to satisfy the scientific method and Daubert.”) (citing Barber, 17 F. App’x at
437).
190. In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 369 F. Supp. 2d 398, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting
Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1039 (N.D. Cal. 1999)).
191. Kuhn v. Wyeth, Inc., 686 F.3d 618, 633 (8th Cir. 2012).
192. Id.; accord In re NuvaRing Prods. Liab. Litig, No. 4:08-MD-1964 RWS, 2013 WL
791787, at *2-3 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 4, 2013).
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conclusions. An Alabama district court judge, for example, asserted
that why an expert “chose to include or exclude data from specific
clinical trials is a matter for cross-examination, not exclusion under
Daubert.”193 Other federal courts have made similar pronouncements.194
C. Conflict over the Requirement that an Expert’s Methodology Be
Objectively Testable
In Daubert, the Supreme Court held that scientific testimony is
not admissible unless it is based on “scientific knowledge.”195 The
Court explained that “[t]he adjective ‘scientific’ implies a grounding
in the methods and procedures of science. Similarly, the word ‘knowledge’ connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation.”196 The Court then gave guidance on how trial courts, as
gatekeepers, should determine whether an expert’s testimony constitutes scientific knowledge: “[I]n order to qualify as ‘scientific
knowledge,’ an inference ... must be derived by the scientific method.”197 The Court defined the scientific method as follows: “Scientific
methodology today is based on generating hypotheses and testing
them to see if they can be falsified; indeed, this methodology is what
distinguishes science from other fields of human inquiry.”198 Thus,
193. In re Chantix (Varenicline) Prods. Liab. Litig., 889 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1288 (N.D. Ala.
2012).
194. See, e.g., In re Celexa & Lexapro Prods. Liab. Litig., 927 F. Supp. 2d 758, 763 (E.D.
Mo. 2013) (declining to decide whether plaintiffs’ expert engaged in improper cherry-picking
when he relied on certain studies to the exclusion of others, holding instead that this is an
issue for cross-examination); In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., No. 04-1616-JWL, 2012 WL
6681783, at *3 (D. Kan. Dec. 21, 2012), aff’d, 768 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2014) (“The extent to
which [an expert] considered the entirety of the evidence in the case is a matter for crossexamination.”); Rich v. Taser Int’l, Inc., No. 2:09-CV-02450-ECR-RJJ, 2012 WL 1080281, at
*6 (D. Nev. Mar. 30, 2012) (holding that which studies an expert chooses to rely upon is an
issue for cross-examination, not admissibility); Bouchard v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., No. 3:98
CV 7541, 2002 WL 32597992, at *7 (N.D. Ohio May 24, 2002) (“If [the plaintiff] believes that
[the expert] ... ignored evidence that would have required him to substantially change his
opinion, that is a fit subject for cross-examination, not a grounds for wholesale rejection of the
expert opinion.”).
195. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-90 (1993).
196. Id. at 590.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 593 (quoting Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in
Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 NW. U.
L. REV. 643, 645 (1992)). The Supreme Court cited two philosophical texts on the nature of
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the Court explained, “a key question to be answered in determining
whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge that will
assist the trier of fact will be whether it can be (and has been)
tested.”199
The Supreme Court provided further clarification on the importance of testability in Joiner.200 In Joiner, the district court excluded
plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions that PCBs could cause lung cancer after
carefully reviewing and rejecting as scientifically unreliable each of
the individual pieces of evidence upon which the experts relied.201
The Eleventh Circuit then reversed, holding that the district court
abused its discretion in failing to credit the experts’ testimony that
the weight of these individually unreliable pieces of evidence provided a scientifically reliable whole.202 The Eleventh Circuit explained:
Opinions of any kind are derived from individual pieces of
evidence, each of which by itself might not be conclusive, but
when viewed in their entirety are the building blocks of a
perfectly reasonable conclusion, one reliable enough to be
submitted to a jury along with the tests and criticisms crossexamination and contrary evidence would supply.203

The Eleventh Circuit did not offer any objective means by which
the experts’ purported weighing of the evidence could be tested.
Rather, under the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning, the district court
was required to simply accept the expert’s assurances that he had
weighed the evidence in a scientifically reliable manner.

scientific evidence. See id. (citing C. HEMPEL, PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL SCIENCE 49 (1966)
(“[T]he statements constituting a scientific explanation must be capable of empirical test.”);
K. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th
ed. 1989) (“[T]he criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability,
or testability.”)).
199. Id.; see also Joe G. Hollingsworth & Eric G. Lasker, The Case Against Differential Diagnosis: Daubert, Medical Causation Testimony, and the Scientific Method, 37 J. HEALTH L.
85, 89-97 (2004) (analyzing the testability of various types of scientific evidence proffered as
support for general or specific causation expert testimony).
200. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 145-47 (1997).
201. See Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 864 F. Supp. 1310, 1319-27 (N.D. Ga. 1994), rev’d, 78 F.3d
524 (11th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
202. Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 524, 532-34 (11th Cir. 1996), rev’g 864 F. Supp. 1310
(N.D. Ga. 1994), rev’d, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
203. Id. at 532.
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By an eight-to-one majority, the Supreme Court reversed.204 Expressly affirming the district court’s approach, the Court tested each
of the individual pieces of scientific evidence relied on by plaintiffs’
experts for scientific reliability and relevance and found them lacking.205 The Court squarely rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s “weight of
the evidence” argument, holding that “it was within the District
Court’s discretion to conclude that the studies upon which the
experts relied were not sufficient, whether individually or in
combination, to support their conclusions that Joiner’s exposure to
PCBs contributed to his cancer.”206 As the Court famously explained,
“nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires
a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to
existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.”207 Justice Stevens,
dissenting, argued to the contrary that “a ‘weight of the evidence’
methodology was scientifically acceptable,” but he was unable to
garner the support of any other member of the Court.208
The 2000 amendments did not alter Rule 702's existing requirement that scientific testimony must be based on “scientific knowledge,” and there is no indication in the Advisory Committee’s deliberations that it had any intent to move away from the Supreme
Court’s understanding of that term as requiring a scientific expert’s
opinion to be derived from the scientific method. To the contrary, by
expressly siding with courts that had read Daubert as mandating “a
rigorous exercise requiring the trial court to scrutinize, in detail, the
expert’s basis, methods, and application,”209 the Advisory Committee
no doubt anticipated that the “key issue” of testability would continue to guide the Daubert analysis. The Advisory Committee decided,
204. See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 137-38.
205. See id. at 145-47.
206. Id. at 146-47 (emphasis added).
207. Id. at 146.
208. Id. at 153 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In Kumho Tire, the
Supreme Court allowed that the “scientific method” analysis in Daubert might not be
applicable to certain types of experienced-based, nonscientific expert testimony. See Kumho
Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999). The Court established a different means by
which trial courts may objectively test such testimony: whether the expert “employs in the
courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in
the relevant field.” Id. at 152. The Court noted, moreover, that “a trial court should consider
the specific factors identified in Daubert where they are reasonable measures of the reliability
of expert testimony.” Id.
209. MAY 1, 1999 REPORT, supra note 28, at 47.
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however, not to delineate specific standards that courts must
employ in regulating expert testimony, and it did not add any
specific language about the scientific method or testability to
amended Rule 702.210
This decision arguably opened the door for a renewed assault on
the scientific methodology requirement for the admission of scientific testimony. In 2003, the toxic tort plaintiffs’ bar used money
from a fund established as part of the silicone breast implant
litigation settlement to sponsor a conference in Coronado, California, that resulted in a slew of policy papers excoriating the Daubert
gatekeeping requirement.211 One paper argued that “the confusions,
misconceptions, and attempts to fuse contradictory philosophies” in
Daubert “is a cautionary tale of what happens when lay people try
to opine on technical matters of another discipline, in this case
jurists holding forth on the philosophy of science.”212 Another paper
argued that “Daubert rests on serious misconceptions about the
nature of science, the goals of legal fact-finding, and the role of the
judiciary.”213 A third described the Court’s Daubert ruling as
“muddled” and castigated the Court’s opinion in Joiner, saying “the
Court sounded like nothing so much as a conclave of medieval logicians.”214 The papers repeatedly attributed to the Court some nefarious scheme to improperly stack the deck in favor of defendants:
210. See DEC. 1, 1997 REPORT, supra note 69, at 4.
211. See David Michaels, Scientific Evidence and Public Policy, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S1,
S5 (2005). Three more conferences followed. See David Michaels & Neil Vidmar, Foreword,
72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. i, ii (2009) (“SKAPP has convened four Coronado Conferences. At
each one a group of distinguished scientists, philosophers of science, judges, and policy experts
presented papers and discussed issues at the intersection of science, law, and public policy.”).
The irony in this funding source cannot be ignored. In the 1980s and 1990s, Dow Corning was
sued in multiple class action lawsuits because of the alleged adverse systemic health effects
of its silicone breast implants, allegations that had no basis in sound science. See David E.
Bernstein, The Breast Implant Fiasco, 87 CAL. L. REV. 457, 471-72 (1999) (book review). In
1998, these lawsuits resulted in a multi-billion-dollar settlement that forced Dow Corning into
bankruptcy. When opt-out plaintiffs tried to pursue these same claims in court, however,
their causation experts were excluded under Daubert because they could not present any scientifically reliable evidence that the breast implants caused any systemic injury whatsoever.
See, e.g., Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1309-22 (11th Cir. 1999).
212. David Ozonoff, Epistemology in the Courtroom: A Little “Knowledge” Is a Dangerous
Thing, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S13, S13 (2005).
213. Sheila Jasanoff, Law’s Knowledge: Science for Justice in Legal Settings, 95 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH S49, S49 (2005).
214. Susan Haack, Trial and Error: The Supreme Court’s Philosophy of Science, 95 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH S66, S69 (2005).
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“The Daubert litigation thus gave the Supreme Court an opportunity to stem the increasing flow of resource-intensive toxic tort
lawsuits through a politically invisible interpretation of the words
‘scientific and knowledge’ in the obscure Federal Rules of
Evidence.”215
These attacks bore fruit in 2011, when the First Circuit issued its
ruling in Milward v. Acuity Specialty Products Group, Inc., allowing
an expert to opine as to the cause of one plaintiff’s acute promyelocytic leukemia based upon the same “weight of the evidence”
methodology that the Supreme Court had rejected in Joiner.216 The
links between the Coronado Conference and the Milward opinion
are unambiguous. In defending the plaintiffs’ expert’s “weight of the
evidence” methodology, the First Circuit expressly relied on: (1) a
Coronado Conference paper by Sheldon Krimsky (upon which plaintiffs’ causation expert also had relied),217 which criticized Daubert
for adopting a “corpuscular approach to expert testimony,”218 and (2)
plaintiffs’ “methodology expert,” Dr. Cranor,219 who had contributed
his own paper at the Coronado Conference in which he argued that
“[t]he Court’s opinion in Joiner risks misleading lower courts,
inviting similar mistaken rejections of particular evidence or having
a chilling effect on efforts to review scientific evidence in the same
way that scientists do.”220
The First Circuit’s own description of the “weight of the evidence”
methodology should have ensured the exclusion of the causation
expert’s testimony. The First Circuit explained that the plaintiffs’
expert’s “ ‘weight of the evidence’ approach to making causal determinations involves a mode of logical reasoning often described as

215. Thomas O. McGarity, Daubert and the Proper Role for the Courts in Health, Safety,
and Environmental Regulation, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S92, S94 (2005).
216. See 639 F.3d 11, 17-18 (1st Cir. 2011).
217. See id. at 17 & n.5 (citing Sheldon Krimsky, The Weight of Scientific Evidence in Policy
and Law, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S129, S129 (2005)).
218. Sheldon Krimsky, The Weight of Scientific Evidence in Policy and Law, 95 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH S129, S134 (2005) (quoting Thomas O. McGarity, Proposal for Linking Culpability
and Causation to Ensure Corporate Accountability for Toxic Risks, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L.
& POL’Y REV. 1, 18 (2001)).
219. See Milward, 639 F.3d at 17-18.
220. Carl Cranor, Scientific Inferences in the Laboratory and the Law, 95 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH S121, S123 (2005).
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‘inference to the best explanation,’ in which the conclusion is not
guaranteed by the premises.”221 The First Circuit continued:
Unlike a logical inference made by deduction where one proposition can be logically inferred from other known propositions, and
unlike induction where a general conclusion can be inferred from
a range of known particulars, inference to the best explanation—or ‘abductive inferences’—are drawn about a particular
proposition or event by a process of eliminating all other possible
conclusions to arrive at the most likely ... one that best explains
the available data.222

This methodology does not describe the derivation of scientific
knowledge; it describes the process of generating hypotheses. As the
First Circuit itself recognized, “[n]o scientific methodology exists for
this process.”223
The First Circuit’s admission of this “weight of the evidence”
testimony blatantly disregarded Daubert’s admonition that expert
testimony must be derived by the scientific method, in other words,
“based on generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can
be falsified.”224 Although a trial court may—as the district court did
in Milward and the Supreme Court did in Joiner—review individual
lines of scientific evidence to determine whether they meet this
admissibility threshold, there is no way for a court to so evaluate
the “weight of the evidence” approach followed by the Milward
expert.225 As the First Circuit acknowledged, this purported “weighing” of scientific evidence cannot be tested, it cannot be falsified, and
it cannot be validated against known or potential rates of error.226
Ultimately, then, the court is left with nothing but the expert’s ipse
dixit assurances that he has weighed the evidence in a scientifically
appropriate manner.

221. Milward, 639 F.3d at 17 (quoting Bitler v. A.O. Smith Corp., 391 F.3d 1114, 1124 n.5
(10th Cir. 2004)).
222. Id. at 17 n.7 (quoting Bitler v. A.O. Smith Corp., 391 F.3d 1114, 1124 n.5 (10th Cir.
2004)).
223. Id. at 18.
224. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).
225. See id.
226. See id.
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Milward was incorrectly decided and should be overruled.227 To
the extent the First Circuit declines to do so, the holding should be
limited to its facts.228 Fortunately, Milward’s endorsement of the
“weight of the evidence” methodology remains a minority position.229
The plaintiffs’ bar, however, is aggressively seeking to promote the
Milward reasoning more broadly.230 Shortly after the Milward
opinion was issued, the American Association for Justice (previously
known as the Association of Trial Lawyers of America) promoted a
symposium, the purpose of which was to gain academic traction for
the weight-of-the-evidence approach as an alternative to Daubert.231
And a handful of courts have now cited Milward as support for the
admission of similarly untestable expert testimony.232 Rule 702
should be amended to put a stop to this abdication of the Daubert
gatekeeping responsibility.

227. For an exhaustive look at the various errors that the Milward court made, see
Bernstein, supra note 5, at 58-66.
228. See Eric Lasker, Manning the Daubert Gate: A Defense Primer in Response to Milward
v. Acuity Specialty Products, 79 DEF. COUNS. J. 128, 128 (2012). Indeed, in a recent opinion,
the First Circuit appeared to have distanced itself from Milward’s reasoning. See Bricklayers
& Trowel Trades Int’l Pension Fund v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 752 F.3d 82, 95 (1st Cir.
2014).
229. See Allen v. Pa. Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 198 (5th Cir. 1996) (“We are also unpersuaded that the ‘weight of the evidence’ methodology these experts use is scientifically acceptable for demonstrating a medical link between Allen’s EtO exposure and brain cancer.”); see
also Hollander v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 289 F.3d 1193, 1216 n.21 (10th Cir. 2002); Magistrini
v. One Hour Martinizing Dry Cleaning, 180 F. Supp. 2d 584, 608 (D.N.J. 2002); Caraker v.
Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1040 (S.D. Ill. 2001); Siharath v. Sandoz Pharm.
Corp., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1371 (N.D. Ga. 2001), aff’d sub nom. Rider v. Sandoz Pharm.
Corp., 295 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2002); Merck & Co. v. Garza, 347 S.W.3d 256, 268 (Tex. 2011);
Estate of George v. Vt. League of Cities & Towns, 993 A.2d 367, 379-80 (Vt. 2010).
230. See infra note 231-32 and accompanying text.
231. Nathan A. Schachtman, Milward Symposium Organized by Plaintiffs’ Counsel and
Witnesses (Feb. 13, 2013, 7:23 AM), http://schachtmanlaw.com/milward-symposium-organizedby-plaintiffs-counsel-and-witnesses [http://perma.cc/PW2V-X7TK].
232. See In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 11-5304, 08-08, 2013
WL 1558690, at *4 (D.N.J. Apr. 10, 2013); Harris v. CSX Transp., Inc., 753 S.E.2d 275, 287-89,
301-02 (W. Va. 2013). Remarkably, Harris also cites to Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion
in Joiner in support of the weight of the evidence approach without any mention of the eightjustice majority opinion to the contrary. 753 S.E.2d at 288-89.
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IV. A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RULE 702
Notwithstanding the rulemaking efforts of the Judicial Conference, the courts remain as divided over Daubert’s meaning today as
they were in the 1990s.233 Wayward courts continue to admit expert
testimony based upon misapplied methodologies, unreliable factual
foundations, and untestable ipse dixit.234 As a result, the judicial
gatekeeping responsibility set forth in the Daubert trilogy—and
purportedly cemented with the 2000 amendments to Rule 702—is
being eroded.235
The Supreme Court is ill-positioned to solve this problem. The
Court can decide only issues in the context of specific cases, and
even if a case cleanly presents one of the many conflicts that have
arisen over Daubert, the other conflicts would remain.236 Moreover,
the Court generally is loath to grant certiorari only to affirm to
lower courts that it meant what it said in an earlier opinion (as
would have been the case in SQM North America).237
The answer lies instead with the Judicial Conference. The 2000
amendments to Rule 702 were well-intentioned and—but for the
active resistance of certain courts, plaintiffs’ counsel, and likeminded academics—should have led to the uniform exclusion of
unreliable expert testimony in the federal courts.238 As a leading
commentator on the Federal Rules of Evidence has noted, however,
“even when the draft of a set of court rules has been subjected to
intense, prolonged scrutiny, regular monitoring is still necessary.”239
The drafters may be too close to their linguistic work product to
recognize latent ambiguities, and unanticipated developments
233. See supra text accompanying notes 37-42.
234. See supra Part III.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 24-34.
236. See Lasker, supra note 228, at 128.
237. See Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen
Years–The Effect of “Plain Meaning” Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advisory Committee on
the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 857, 911 (1992).
238. See supra text accompanying notes 28-31.
239. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Golden Anniversary of the “Preliminary Study of the
Advisability and Feasibility of Developing Uniform Rules of Evidence for the Federal Courts”:
Mission Accomplished?, 57 WAYNE L. REV. 1367, 1384 (2011).
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can force the courts to apply the statutory texts to unforeseen
factual settings. No matter how earnestly the drafting committee has discharged its task, when the draft is promulgated
monitoring and revision mechanisms should be put in place.240

As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, fifteen years of experience under amended Rule 702 teaches that revisions to the Rule
are needed. These revisions need not involve wholesale changes. To
the contrary, each of the three conflicts discussed above could be
resolved through the following simple amendments to the current
Rule:
Rule 702. Testimony by Expert Witnesses241
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
opinion or otherwise if the testimony satisfies each of the
following requirements:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data that
reliably support the expert’s opinion;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable and objectively
reasonable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and
methods to the facts of the case and reached his conclusions without resort to unsupported speculation.
Appeals of district court decisions under this Rule are considered
under the abuse-of-discretion standard. Such decisions are evaluated with the same level of rigor regardless of whether the district
court admitted or excluded the testimony in question.
This Rule supersedes any preexisting precedent that conflicts
with any or all sections of this Rule.

The first proposed language change would move the In re Paoli
“any step” standard from the current Advisory Committee Note to

240. Id.
241. Additions marked by italicized text; deletions marked by strikethrough.
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the text of the Rule, immediately prior to the listing of the four subsection admissibility requirements. Although the Supreme Court
has held that judges may consult an Advisory Committee Note as a
useful guide to the meaning of a federal rule,242 the Note is not part
of the Rule itself and does not have the force of law.243 The Ninth
Circuit’s ruling in SQM North America makes clear that the current
endorsement of In re Paoli in the Advisory Committee Note is insufficient.244 By explicitly requiring trial courts to address each of the
four steps in Rule 702, the revised Rule would unambiguously reject
the looser standard in place in the Ninth Circuit and would preclude
courts in the future from ignoring the mandate in subsection (d)
that an expert reliably apply his methodology to the facts of the
case.245 The proposed amendment would also incorporate Daubert’s
express rejection of “unsupported speculation”246 at the end of subsection (d), and would incorporate into the language of the Rule the
holding in Joiner that “conclusions and methodology are not entirely
distinct from one another.”247
The second proposed language change would place the reliability
requirement for an expert’s factual predicate squarely within Rule
702(b), rather than counting on trial courts to read such a requirement from a combination of Rules 702(b), 702(c) and Rule 703. At
the same time, the proposed language would address the concern
that some commentators raised in connection with the 2000 amendments—that the trial court not intrude upon the province of the jury
to weigh the credibility of facts—by clarifying where the trial court’s
scrutiny should be directed.248 The question under Daubert is not
whether a specific fact is true or false.249 That determination is properly left for the jury.250 Rather, the question is whether a specific

242. See Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 321 (2009).
243. See United States v. Bainbridge, 746 F.3d 943, 947 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Tome v.
United States, 513 U.S. 150, 168 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he Notes cannot, by some
power inherent in the draftsmen, change the meaning that the Rules would otherwise bear.”).
244. See City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 750 F.3d 1036, 1041, 1047-48 (9th Cir.
2014).
245. See FED. R. EVID. 702(d).
246. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).
247. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
248. See supra notes 28-31, 89 and accompanying text.
249. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
250. See id. at 596.
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fact, or set of facts, provides a reliable basis for an expert opinion.251
This question involves both a qualitative component—whether this
is the type of fact upon which experts in the field would reasonably
rely252—and a quantitative assessment—whether the expert considered enough of the relevant facts to reliably opine.253 Thus, for example, the proven facts that a river is contaminated and that the
same toxin is present at an industrial plant several thousand feet
from the river’s edge do not, without more, provide a reliable basis
for an expert to opine that the contaminant in the river came from
the plant.254 Likewise, the proven fact that a mouse injected with a
massive dose of a chemical gets cancer does not provide a reliable
foundation for an opinion that the chemical can cause cancer
through lower-dose exposures in humans.255
The third proposed language change would incorporate the Supreme Court’s requirement of scientific methodology into the text of
Rule 702(c). Absent some objective means of testing an expert’s
methodology, a trial court is left with nothing but its view of the
credibility of an expert’s ipse dixit, an assessment that, as a general
matter, is outside the proper scope of a court’s gatekeeping authority.256 The requirement of objective testability, by contrast, will
provide an independent standard by which courts can make consistent rulings on the admissibility of expert testimony. Of course, the
nature of this objective testing will depend upon the nature of the
expert testimony. If the expert testifies as to scientific knowledge,
his methodology should be testable according to the dictates of
science, that is, “generating hypotheses and testing them to see if
they can be falsified.”257 If an expert testifies based upon experience,
however, a court should test the opinion by determining whether the
251. See id. at 589.
252. See id. at 595.
253. See id. at 597.
254. See Kalamazoo River Study Grp. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 171 F.3d 1065, 1072 (6th Cir.
1999).
255. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1997).
256. See, e.g., Elcock v. Kmart Corp., 223 F.3d 734, 751 (3d Cir. 2000). But see Glastetter
v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1024-25 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (explaining that
cross-examination of plaintiff ’s expert at Daubert hearing was “particularly instructive”
because the expert “demonstrated frequent episodes of poor or selective memory, and his
answers, when challenged, demonstrate[d] the unreliability of his conclusions”), aff’d, 252
F.3d 986 (8th Cir. 2001).
257. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
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expert “employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor
that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.”258
Finally, the proposed amendment would add two provisions to
help ensure that courts properly apply the Rule. The first provision
would codify the abuse-of-discretion standard set forth in Joiner for
district court opinions whether they admit or exclude expert testimony, and thus prevent future courts from following the erroneous
path laid out in Johnson and SQM North America.259 The second
provision would expressly preclude courts from ignoring the plain
language of Rule 702 in preference for prior judicial rulings that
adopted different standards for expert admissibility. The process of
amending Rule 702 for a second time should, itself, have the added
benefit of focusing judicial attention on the Rule. The Daubert opinion, however, received a great deal of attention; the 2000 amendments much less so, to the extent that courts and commentators
commonly refer to the admissibility test for expert testimony as
“Daubert.”260 The proposed added provision should end the practice
of courts relying on post-1993 cases even when those cases conflict
with the text of Rule 702.
Disputes over the scope of the trial court’s gatekeeping role
should not be fought out with dueling citations to outdated precedent or ambiguous statements in the common law. Indeed, it is
exactly this type of indeterminacy in evidence law that resulted in
the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975.261 Rule 702
sets forth the law of expert admissibility in federal courts, and it is
the Rule’s provisions ultimately that govern.262 We should make
certain that the Rule is properly stated to accomplish its task.
CONCLUSION
By codifying the more rigorous and structured approach to expert
admissibility envisioned in the Daubert trilogy, the 2000 amendments to Rule 702 sought to improve the administration of justice
by resolving the debate that had emerged in the courts in the 1990s
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).
See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 143.
See supra text accompanying notes 35-41.
Imwinkelried, supra note 239, at 1368-69.
See FED. R. EVID. 702.
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over the proper meaning of Daubert. Fifteen years later, however,
it is clear that the Rule has only partially accomplished its objective.
Many courts continue to resist the judiciary’s proper gatekeeping
role, either by ignoring Rule 702’s mandate altogether or by aggressively reinterpreting the Rule’s provisions.
Informed by this additional history of recalcitrance, the time has
come for the Judicial Conference to return to the drafting table and
finish the job it began in 2000. Rule 702 should be amended to secure the promise of Daubert and effectively protect future litigants
and juries from the powerful and quite misleading impact of unreliable expert testimony.

